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[Notes made by David Irving during research for the second volume of his Churchill’s War.
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IN THE Public Record Office in London (PRO) are now housed the records of the former Police section at Bletchley Park, where British codebreakers had begun reading the German SS and police messages even before WWII.
The police section amassed thousands of intercepts of police units on the eastern front, police headquarters in Germany, and concentration camp commandants reporting to Berlin. It is worth noting, as the late Professor Sir Frank Hinsley the official historian points out, that nowhere in these myriads of (top secret, enciphered) messages is there any reference to gas chambers or gassings. ‘The returns from Auschwitz, the largest of the camps with 20,000 prisoners, mentioned illness as the main cause of death, but included references to shootings and hangings. There were no references in the decrypts to gassing.’ [Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Cambridge, 1979 – 84, 3 vols., vol. ii, appendix, page 673.]
See too the Dec 1, 1941 intercepts posted elsewhere here. |
 November 16, 1996
Sir, Professor Richard Breitman’s achievement in winkling out of The United States Government of the transcripts of the telegraphic reports of The Nazi Einsatzgruppen killer squads in Russia in 1941 (report, “Britain knew Jews were being killed ‘before Auschwitz’ “) is to be applauded. However, it should be recalled that in 1981 Professor F. H. Hinsley revealed that the British intelligence Enigma decrypts of German telegraphic traffic also included German police and security reports of their mass killing of Jew’s in Russia and the Ukraine in the autumn of 1941. Summaries of those decrypts were submitted to Winston Churchill on a regular basis and these were eventually made available for public inspection at the Public Record Office, Kew, in November 1993. Three years ago my efforts to have transcripts of the decrypts themselves made available at Kew proved abortive. In view of Professor Breitman’s success in Washington, and of the nonsense that this makes of Britain’s unwillingness or inability to release the British holdings of these documents, I have now written to the Prime Minister asking for their release. Yours etc. |
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| WHAT IS surprising is that although every minute detail of SS and concentration camp operations is mirrored in these thousands of messages, preserved either in the original German, or in English translation (and sometimes in both) there is no reference whatever to mass killing operations by gas or any other method in the camps.
Every other conceivable detail is however reflected in the signals, including a signal to Auschwitz commandant S.S. Sturmbannführer Rudolf Höss in September 1942 regretting that rubber truncheons are ‘unobtainable in Breslau.’ [GC&CS German Police report No. 41, 1942, Oct 5, 1942 (PRO file HW.16/6, part ii).] |
| Bletchley Park historians recalled the German code weaknesses and security lapses, always the same addresses at the beginning, e.g. ‘An den Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei in Frankfurt am Main’ which ‘made the cryptographer’s life a happy one.’ Indications of internal disintegration in Germany were disappointingly few. Interception of low-frequency traffic was much easier in France. On the evening of May 9, 1940 there was decoded the urgent German summons to prevent a high official from crossing into Holland; this was the only hint of GELB from this source. Work did not then resume until August 1940 at BP. Berlin began to jump on security breaches, like messages exceeding the maximum permitted 180 letters and easy standard cribs, like a daily report on the rise and fall of the Elbe. For the BARBAROSSA traffic a separate key and new frequencies were instituted; in August 1941 two sets of keys in the East were introduced for each day. Even so they got 30 to 100 decodes a day, with forty staff working on the task. |
On September 13, 1941 Kurt Daluege, Chef der Ordnungspolizei, sent the following message to the HSSuPf of the forces in Russia,
The scale of these executions was ‘a clear indication of the utter ruthlessness of the Germans in Russia.’ The GC&CS report adds,
The result was the reverse of what the Germans had intended, because if they had retained Double Transposition with still further splitting up of keys it would soon have put BP out of business, Double Playfair quickly proved to be a most breakable cypher, and it became the exception to fail to break a day. From the spring of 1942 the Russians began providing high quality raw intercepts; in return BP provided decrypts and daily keys until December — they say — when liaison unfortunately broke down and nothing more was received. Throughout the winter of 1942 German police traffic was one of the few sources providing information from the eastern front, but in November the German police, nervous again about security, introduced their next major cypher alteration. By February 1943 however the section was again up to four to five hundred decodes a week. BP now had five hundred people, including those at the ‘Y’ stations dedicated to this task, working on the Police codes. Things got easy in July 1944 when the Police Flying Squadron in Poland sent in a standard daily report. But on September 1, 1944, the Germans introduced the new raster cypher, the best hand-cypher they had ever devised; the time-lag now increased from twenty-four hours to a week or more. ‘The content of the messages was, naturally, of increasing interest and provides as a whole a singular picture of the last days of the Nazi reigime and of its individual leaders. For this reason cryptographic work was continued long after VE-day (no police-keys were ever captured) ‘ [GC&CS, ‘History of the German Police Section, 1939–45’ in PRO file HW.3/155.] |
CX/MSS/1071/T6. On June 9, 1942 ‘Most Secret, Chefsache, Nur durch Offizier’ this order was sent by OKW WFSt Qu Abt. K to Pz Armee Afrika ):
This was passed to General Auchinleck at 5:11 p.m., June 12, as MK/6635. Churchill noted next to the final para, ‘C keep for record. WSC 13.vi.’ (OKW WFSt QM dept Kalif (Pz Armee Afrika ), Jun 9, 1942, intercept CX/MSS/1071/T6, dated Jun 12, 1942 (PRO file HW.1/643); original signal is OKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw.) an PzArmee Afrika über Dt General b Obdko d Ital. Wehramcht, 9.6.1942, FRR Fernschreiben, gKdos, Chefs, NA T313/476/4572.] |
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On October 26, 1942 the codebreakers found Berlin warning Auschwitz to stand by to receive two visitors from the Führer’s Chancellery in Berlin – the agency supervising euthanasia and various other killing schemes – for a lengthy stay at the camp: they would be setting up an X-ray sterilisation operation, the radio signal said (this being the method chosen by the S.S. to keep the Jews from breeding). (GC&CS German Police Section intercept: Lolling, Amt D III, to Auschwitz, Oct 26, 1942 (PRO file HW.16/11).]
On October 27, 1942 Sachsenhausen reported that it was shipping to Auschwitz two hundred Soviet prisoners of war found to have contracted tuberculosis. (GC&CS German Police Section intercept: KL Sachsenhausen (gez. Liebehenschel) an Amt D III, Oct 27, 1942 (PRO file HW.16/11).] After Berlin ordered that all camp fatalities were to be reported, on December 1, 1942 Buchenwald dutifully reported, in their secret code, a total of 134 deaths from natural causes during November including four Jews. (GC&CS German Police Section intercept: KL Buchenwald (gez. Hoven) an Amt D III, betr Meldung der Todesfällen von Häftlingen, Dec 1, 1942 (PRO file HW.16/11).] On December 8, 1942 Dr Wirths reported twenty-seven male and thirty-six female typhus deaths in Auschwitz during the previous week. (GC&CS German Police Section intercept: KL Auschwitz, signed Dr Wirths, an Amt D III, btr Stand der Fleckfiebererkrankungen , Dec 8, 1942 (PRO file HW.16/11).] |
During early 1943 the intercepts were found to contain with greater frequency the word Sonderbehandlung, special treatment, which was evidently a thinly veiled reference to the termination of Germany’s enemies. [Re Sonderbehandlung.] In one such message on January 17, 1943 the chief of police in Kiev reported laconically, ‘So far 853 screened and 614 special-treated.’ (GC&CS German Police Section intercept GPD1238I/2/4 Jan 18, 1943: BdS Kiew und Befehlststelle Sipo und SD, Owritsch, to Berlin, Jan 17, 1943 (PRO file HW.16/11).] A month later a report to the same police chief in Kiev after completion of the anti-partisan sweep HORNUNG listed the body count as
(GC&CS German Police Section intercept: Bericht an HSSuPf Kiew, Gesamtergebnis Unternehmen Hornung , 1943 (PRO file HW.16/11).] ‘German Police, 34/42’ signed ACT, July 19, 1942 :
ACT commented that ‘Capos’ appear to be overseers or foremen selected from among the prisoners themselves. (A signal timed June 23, 1942]. (PRO file HW.1/761] The same report states (‘German Police, 34/42’ signed ACT, July 19, 1942:], ‘A message from Himmler to SS Gruppenführer Jedicke, Riga, seems to refer to the abiding quarrel between the SS and the Army.
( July 7, 1942 ). (PRO file HW.1/761). |
| SS Gruf. Müller to Auschwitz September 10, 1942 , betr Vollzug von Standgerichturteilen. ‘Das von Standgericht Emburg ausgesprochene Todesurteil gegen Walzendreher Eugen Biren, geboren 6.4.14, ist durch Erschiessen zu vollziehen.’
Telegram Lolling to Auschwitz, October 26, 1942 , ‘Der Chef des Amtes D III bittet 2 Herren von der Kanzlei des Führers am Donnerstag den 29.10.1942, 0940 Uhr, vom Bahnhof Mylowitz abzuholen, und für längere Zeit im Lager unterzubringen. Es handelt sich um die Röntgensterilisation, die nunmehr anlaufen soll. Gleichzeitig wird der Scharführer OLTM als erster SDG im KL.AU bestätigt.’ (In a PRO file HW16/9, ‘German police reports, unnumbered’ are the following:] Report dated November 24, 1942 , on Police Battalions, their movements, by number, 1 through 325. Report on Police Regiments Interrogation of SS Hauptscharführer Robert Barth, Austrian. Was member of Einsatzgruppe D in Russia from June 1941. [Another report from Auschwitz, November 9, 1942, to Amt D III, btr Fleckfiebererkrankungen ] December 8, 1942 : seit 1.12.42 27 Tote im Männerlager, 36 im Frauenlager. |
| The PRO file HW.16/11, Extracts from Decodes, German Police Section contains flimsy original typed copies in German of intercepted signals from ten concentration camps to Amt D III (Glücks) and from eastern front police units e.g. Sonderkommando Bragin, engaged in Bandenbekämpfung, with typical entries relating to such operations, weapons found, Banditen, Cetniks, hostages shot, etc., executions of ‘83 aus politischem Sektor’ ; a series of reports of prisoners including individually named Jews (e.g. Hermann Israel Dingfelder) being shot August – September 1942 bei Fluchtversuch aus dem Lager Flossenbürg. Also a report dated December 1, 1942 from Buchenwald to Amt D III, betr Meldung der Todesfällen von Häftlingen, im November 1942, listing those of naturliche Todesursache , 134 altogether, including 4 Jews (gez. Hoven). Fahrgenehmigung signed by Liebehenschel for Lkw for Exekution von 3 polnischen Zivilarbeitern in Flossenbürg. January 18, 1943 GPD1238I/2/4: DRE9 Nr.6 1630 172 SQO ES 2 Ab BdS KIEW und Befehlststelle Sipo und SD, OWRUTSCH 17.1.43, 45 Sonderbehandlung. Bisher 853 überprüft und 614 sonderbehandelt . ( . . . remainder corrupt . . .] Von SD BRAGIN (Bragin was a location behind the eastern front]. There is a report on February 19, 1943 to HSSuPf Führungsstab Kiew on Operation HORNUNG, which includes Gesamtergebnis: A) Feindtote 82, B) Verdächtige und Sonderbehandelte 1124, C) Arbeitskräfte, Reich 70, D) Vernichtete 36 Bandenlager, darunter 2 Grosslager aus über 100 kleineren Lagern mit Kampfständen und Bunkern. March 23, 1943 References to Vollstreckung von Todesurteilen gegen Iwan Malomanow, etc, angeordnet von S.S Obergruppenführer Prützmann. |
| MI14(d)/0/161 a ‘most secret source’ reports on June 3, 1943 on a disappointing lack of chaos caused by the attacks on German dams in early hours of May 17, 1943 . The Germans, it seemed, had moved with usual efficiency to repair the damage. By 0950 operational police HQ Möhne had been set up. Nothing in the intercepts indicated any public disturbance or rioting had resulted, units were withdrawing on May 21, the few Ruhr bridges which had been closed were reopened to traffic on May 23 and 24. ‘It is perhaps also of interest to note that up to and including 23 May no message about the dams was reported by the ordinary most secret police source, although most air raids have been reflected in requests from German policemen on active service to come home on compassionate leave or, if at home, to have leave extended.’ (PRO file, ‘German police reports, unnumbered,’ file HW16/9). |
Hut 3 sent to CSS personal, etc, Inglis, et al in Whitehall, Apr 19, 1945 , intercept CX/MSS/C.476 (marked and sidelined in green ink: ‘Boniface’) a signal from SS WVHA, Amtsgruppe D, Oranienburg, signed Glücks, SS Gruf und GenLtn d Waffen SS Funkspruch dated April 16, 1945, to HSSuPf Main, SS OGruf und Gen d Pol Dr (Benno] Martin:
(Glücks to Martin, Apr 16; intercept CX/MSS/C.476 sent by Hut 3 to CSS, Inglis, et al., Apr 19, 1945 (PRO file HW.1/3713).] General Gustave Bertrand’s 1973 book Enigma also mentions on pages 117 – 8 the SS messages dealing with the executions of Jews. Cooper thinks they were sent in Enigma ORANGE – a steckered Enigma key, but one often broken by hand methods in Hut Six at this time. ‘See History of Hut ix, vol. ii, page 2.’
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| Miscellaneous. In the Public Record Office War Office Intelligence files there are also interrogations referring to Auschwitz in file WO.208/4296. Interrogations of
and other such items, all very indeterminate about actual goings-on (as only hearsay). |
© Focal Point 1998 |
